Running Head: Suicide Bomber Preparation.

Suicide Bomber (PBIED) Preparation for The City of Orlando, Fl.

Anibal Saez, Jr.

City of Orlando Fire Department,

Orlando, Florida

November 19, 2010

Certification Statement

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where the language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

Signed: _____

Abstract

The problem is that the Orlando Fire Department does not have an emergency operations plan (EOP) that covers a suicide bomber incident. Though there are a conglomeration of SOP's that would be used to for a PBIED, the author poses this observation: a PBIED attack is a hybrid of an incident possessing unique facets that would require specific actions not covered in the current SOP's.

The purpose of this ARP is to create a SOP that will provide support for an EOP and provide guidance for OFD personnel during a suicide bomber incident. The objective included case studies of a PBIED incidents and exercises in order to draw information for the recommendations submitted. PBIED incidents from Dimona, Israel in 2008 and London, England in 2007 were reviewed. The exercises used were the New Castle Airport, DE in 2007 and the Lake County, FL. in 2008.

To achieve a solution for the problem and to satisfy the purpose, the author used a two pronged research methodology. A historical and an action method were utilized in order to develop a base of knowledge for the recommendations and to answer the following questions: What are the elements for the creation of an EOP? What are the requirements, per FEMA's CPG-101 for a suicide bombing incident? How have other fire departments addressed suicide bomber incidents? How has OFD addressed potential suicide bombing incidents? How could a terrorism annex to the City of Orlando's EOP address OFD's and OPD's need?

The author concluded that OFD, OPD and EM did not possess any specific PBIED plans. To correct the problem the author identified that an "Incident Specific Annex" (ISA) is necessary for EM and both OFD and OPD need to create SOP's to support the ISA. The author created a draft policy for OFD and an IED worksheet for detonation within a structure for OFD to consider as a SOP.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Throughout the late 20th century and in this new millennium the prevalence of violent acts in the public realm involving mass casualties have become favorite tactics for those seeking an infamous name or those seeking propaganda for their cause. These events not only attract attention from the media, but they can also be used as an example for those looking to do harm to others for ideological purposes, political gain or change. These events include the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED), mass shootings, otherwise known as an "active shooter" to law enforcement and suicide bombers, just to name a few examples. Mainstream society usually lump these types of events under the term of terrorism.

The U.S. Patriot Act defines acts of domestic terrorism as actions taken by individuals or a group that, "(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States" (U.S. Patriot Act, 2010).

Public safety entities have attempted to avoid these types of incidents with the use of intelligence, target identification, target hardening and counter-terrorism strategies and tactics. Strategies and tactics of counter-terrorism and intelligence usually fall under federal governmental and regional agencies. One such example is the Joint Terrorism Task-Force's (JTTF's) that have an element from federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Once the event has occurred, public safety organizations then enter into the response mode. At times these response modes have been relatively short in duration not only by public safety standards, but also in the media. There have also been a number of these incidents that have turned into extended operations, taxing the resources beyond the capabilities of the authority having jurisdiction.

Incidents such as the David Koresh and the Branch Dividian incident in Waco Texas, the bombing at the Mauro Building in Oklahoma City and both World Trade Center incidents have turned into major campaign incidents where resources are stretched to their limits. These events have also tested local and national Emergency Management plans.

The City of Orlando has experienced at least three incidents over the last 10 years that have turned into extended public safety operations. These events initially taxed their resources and two of the incidents required a multijurisdictional cooperation, especially from law enforcement, at the early phases of the incident. All three of these incidents were "no notice, high-risk, low occurrence" scenarios. Each required involvement by the City of Orlando's Emergency Management with differing levels of activation. The city's generic high-risk incident action plan was the only plan in place at that time; it was utilized and functioned as expected.

Recognizing that high-risk incidents did contain some common requirements, it was also realized that different type of events required some specific planning. Incidents such as IED's, active shooter, weapons of mass destruction (WMD's) each carried strategies and tactics that basically have similar requirements for mitigation, but they also have unique challenges that require specialized teams, training and plans. It became evident that each incident type needed some specificity in action and resources beyond the basic "all hazards" philosophy of current planning practices. SOP's and policies and procedures (P&P's) were developed for these high-risk incidents, but of all critical incidents, a suicide bombing has had the least attention. While one can categorize such an incident as being a mass casualty; the current international trends for suicide bombing incident that have occurred were conducted with secondary person borne IED's (PBIED) and/or multiple events in a relatively small geographic radius from the initial event.

Under these circumstances OFD, OPD and the Emergency Manager (EM) for the City of Orlando are left with adlibbing and attempting to predict the needs of units working the incident. Although OFD,

OPD and the EM have an acute understanding of resources required to support large scale, high-risk incidents, a void exists in the planning and preparation, specifically for a PBIED event.

The problem is that the Orlando Fire Department does not have an emergency operations plan (EOP) that covers of a suicide bomber incident. The purpose of this ARP is to create a SOP that will provide support for an EOP and provide guidance for OFD personnel during a suicide bomber incident. The objective will include the assessment of OFD's SOP's, Orlando Police Department's (OPD) P&P's and the city's EMP. Case studies will also be conducted of suicide bomber incidents and training exercises to assist in creating an EOP for OFD.

In order to satisfy the purpose and attain a solution for the problem, the author will use an action research methodology to answer the following questions. 1. What are the elements for the creation of an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)? 2. What are the requirements, per FEMA's CPG-101, for a suicide bombing incident? 3. How have other fire departments addressed suicide bomber incidents? 4. How has OFD addressed potential suicide bombing incidents? 5. How could a terrorism annex to the City of Orlando's EOP address OFD's and OPD's need in regards to a PBIED incident?

Background and significance

The City of Orlando's Economic Development Board (EDB) conducted a growth management plan and completed a "2006-2030 Growth Projection Report" in 2007. The City of Orlando is approximately 112 square miles (sq. mi.) with a projected growth to over 125 sq. mi. by 2030 (City of Orlando, 2007). The population density of residents alone is projected to go from 2,033 people/sq. mi. in 2006 to 2,650 by 2030 (City of Orlando, 2007). This report included data about the "city wide service population." This population is composed of citizens, the homeless, tourists, and those employed within the city limits on a daily basis (City of Orlando, 2007). The daily tourist population alone for 2010 is estimated to be 35,000 and grow to 63,500 by 2030. The overall daily population for 2010 is estimated to be approximately 411,600 and expected to rise over 546,000 by 2030 (City of Orlando, 2007).

The City of Orlando is also the only city in the United States (U.S.) that has a major international airport and two major theme parks within its jurisdiction. Orlando International Airport (OIA) is the thirteenth busiest airport in the U.S. with an approximate 33.7 million passengers in 2009 (Orlando International Airport, 2010). Orlando's two main theme parks, Universal Studios and Islands of Adventure, had approximately 5.4 and 4.5 million visitors, respectively in 2009 (Orlando/Orange County Convention & Visitor Bureau (OOCCVB), 2010). Other theme parks that have become synonymous with Orlando include Walt Disney World's Magic Kingdom and Epcot Center along with Sea World which combine for an estimated 34 million visitors in 2009 (OOCCVB, 2010).

On June 3, 2010 the author attended a Man Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS) training hosted by Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), Valencia Community College's (VCC) Law Enforcement Academy and the Department of Defense (DOD). This training was to provide first responders the ability to recognize the threat that MANPADS posed for OIA as well as the components and signs of their use. During the class, the instructors rated Orlando and Las Vegas "at the top" of potential targets (J.M. Moore, personal communication, June 3, 2010). This was based on the fact that these locations were well recognized for tourism and that the global impact of shooting down a passenger aircraft would be devastating, due to the international nature of these cities. The instructor also emphasized an incident would have a devastating effect that terrorist seek; vast economic impact and global media attention.

Since the terror events of September 11, 2001 and the Anthrax events in 2001, there have not been any spectacular terrorist events occur on U.S. soil. Most of the events that have been highly publicized are events in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans need to remember that terrorism is not just an isolated occurrence in the Middle East involving violent fundamentalist Islamic organizations; where foreign incidents involve American tourist and targets. It is also being imported into the U.S. by legal entry and illegal entry through a large and weakly protected boarder. One of the most exploited points of entry by terrorists has become the US and Mexican Boarder.

These entry points are the very same entry points used by illegal Central and South American immigrants in Arizona and Texas. According to Atlanta based WSBTV, an American Broadcast Company (ABC) affiliate, the U.S./Mexican Boarder is being crossed by "OTM's, other than Mexican" illegal immigrants (WSBTV, 2010). These "OTM's" included illegal aliens from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and other countries that have been known to sponsor terrorism. There are a total of 35 countries that are known as special interest countries and have been "designated by our intelligence community as countries that could export individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism" (Aguilar, 2005). Members from well known terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Al-Qaida have already crossed the border and have established themselves here in the U.S. (McCaul, 2007).

The issue facing the U.S. is that terrorist, both domestic and foreign, continue to develop and modify their tactics. Organized terrorism has basically developed itself into a science. The role of intelligence and counter intelligence, assessment and reassessment has become a key element to any organization or any individual with mal-intent. The concern is that "terrorists will continually update their methods to carry out spectacular attacks that influence and create media exposure for their cause" (National Counter Terrorism Center, 2009). Another element of the science for mal-intent has been the globalization of "how to manuals" and the freedom of the press. The internet has created a mechanism for individuals and groups to conduct research and development to plan their criminal plans and implement personal/criminal mission to cause the death of innocent civilians. For example, a feature used by terrorists has been web-cams overseeing targets, that can be found on the internet. It was reported that the May 1, 2010 Time Square, N.Y. car bomber used the internet to view web-cams of his intended target for planning the timing of the attack (Law Enforcement Sensitive communication, June 1, 2010).

Be it an international, domestic terrorist or a rouge individual with an agenda, either political or personal; it is necessary that the community and its public safety personnel be prepared. Events such as an active shooter have been well documented here in the U.S. The City of Orlando had such an incident back in November of 2009. Although this was an event in which law enforcement trains for, it was the

first of such an event in the city of Orlando in over 30 years. The challenge of bringing EMS crews into a building and a cordoned area where there was not a 100% certainty of the location of the shooter was uncharted territory. As a consequence, this incident led to a joint training exercise in May of 2010 to get a better grasp on scene management. This also led to having our Emergency Manager realize the importance of having either himself or a representative from his office monitor events as they unfolded at the police communications center.

Using a Risk/Vulnerability Matrix, an active shooter could be placed in the high frequency / high severity zone. This is because the public safety entities in the U.S. have developed training and plans to handle such an incident due to incidents across the county. Comparatively speaking incidents such as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) can be placed in the low frequency / high severity zone. Even VBIED's have occurred in the U.S., and organizations that have faced such incidents have created plans and conducted training to deal with such events.

One such event occurred on May 1, 2010 in New York City, when the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) Engine 54 and Ladder Truck 4 responded to a reported vehicle fire. Based on their training and experience the crews recognized that a "routine call was a potentially game-changing terrorist incident" (International Firefighter, 2010). Organizations that have Hazardous Devices Technicians have also received training on such scenarios to render IED's safe.

Unlike an active shooter or a bombing scenario, a suicide bombing event is one where the hazards go beyond a general mass casualty and scene of violence. Where organizations have fallen short has been in the realm of the suicide bomber planning. The author, as a certified bomb tech took part in a regional Bomb Squad training exercise in spring of 2008. This training involved active shooters and improvised explosive devices (IED's). It culminated with a suicide bomber in a room full of victims. It was apparent to the author that there was a true lack of pre-planning on the strategies and tactics for the end-game of such an event.

Though incident strategy and tactics are an element of a Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the execution of such plans and the unpredictability of such events can escalate from a simple mass casualty incident to an extended campaign scenario. Another factor is the potential that a PBIED incident may have a secondary bomber waiting to target the first responders. Plans and training, especially pre-event preparation, is critical for operational safety and success.

Public safety has always been plagued with being reactionary. Since there has not been a successful PBIED incident that has taken place in the U.S., the perceived need of having a plan has not materialized. It is this reactionary habit and the lack of perceived need that has had a negative impact on planning and preparation. This behavior, or attitude, is the enemy of the fire service and the community it serves.

The National Fire Academy (NFA) has created the Executive Fire Officer Program (EFOP) to develop and enhance the capabilities of fire service leadership. The EFOP also serves as a vehicle to develop "change agents" for the fire service to battle detrimental attitudes and behaviors. Each course emphasizes important responsibilities of the fire service. The Executive Analysis of Fire Service Operations in Emergency Management (EAFSOEM) is one of those courses. This course covers the roles and responsibilities of Emergency Management (EM). One of these responsibilities is conducting a "community risk and capability assessment" (NFA, 2007, p. 4-1). By analyzing all of the effects a PBIED would have, not just at the local but at the national level, this event would be classified as a "very high risk" for a community (NFA, 2007, p. 4-5).

The EAFSOEM student manual delineates the three basic "categories of hazards that planners" are concerned with, this includes national security and terrorist threats (NFA, 2007, p. 4-5). Without a doubt a PBIED would satisfy the category of terrorism; yet OFD and the City of Orlando do not possess a specific plan.

The EAFSOEM student manual also presents the concept of the "dread factor." This is the inherent fear that people have about the consequences of a hazard or incident. Those hazards that are "uncontrollable / unobservable" are the most feared by the community and demand that action be taken (NFA, 2007, p. 4-9). Suicide bombings (PBIED's) carry a very real dread factor. This is because the control of an attack is in the hands of the terrorist; thus making it an uncontrollable hazard but the aftermath being pervasively observable.

The author has chosen to research the mitigation of a PBIED and the planning, or lack there of, to assist OFD and the citizens they serve. This research has two goals. First is to fulfill the operational objectives as set by the U.S. Fire Administration; specifically to "reduce risk at the local level", "improve local planning and preparedness," and to improve first responders "capability for response to and recovery" for a PBIED (USFA, 2010). The second is to have a positive impact on the planning and preparedness of the community.

Literature Review

The author recognizes that Orlando's Fire and Police Departments are not completely prepared for the 'no notice', low occurrence/high severity incident of a PBIED. This observation is based on the author's training and experience as a firefighter/paramedic, certified Bomb Technician, and an active law enforcement officer. While both have assets that will potentially allow them to set the bar in PBIED planning in the region, it was found that the majority of local public safety organizations have an "all hazards" incident plan in case of a terrorist event. These event plans have been integrated in a Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) SOP, P&P or other such documents. Though training has been conducted throughout the country for preparation and planning of these events, the vast majority of public safety organizations lack the mental and operational preparation required to mitigate such PBIED incidents in a truly smooth and coordinated manner.

As a member of a public safety organization, the author is well aware of the reactionary mind-set that organizations have. An incident has to occur or a negative outcome must materialize before new plans and policies are developed. From a risk management perspective, organizations should consider research and development by using a basic Risk / Vulnerability Matrix (Appendix A), especially when dealing with "high-risk" incidents. Using the law enforcement perspective, especially the Orlando Police Department's (OPD), "high-risk" incidents can be placed on such a Risk /Vulnerability Matrix to asses the needs for pre-planning (Appendix B). These "high-risk incidents include bomb threats, weapons of mass destruction (WMD's), active shooters and civil disturbances. From many law enforcement, fire service and EMS perspectives, a suicide bombing incident is looked upon as a crime scene, a bombing and MCI with the potential of an additional hazards being present. This is why basic SOP's and other plans exist and are relied upon for the mitigation of these events.

On review of OPD's Policy and Procedure 1308.3 "Major Incidents" (P&P 1308.3), it was noted that there were specific incidents types, but not for a PBIED. They have addressed the "high-risk" incidents by assigning the command of such an incident to a Deputy Chief (OPD, 2008). OFD has also addressed the general "high-risk" incidents with SOP's and policies dealing with WMD's, hazardous devices and MCI's. The basic premise of OFD's SOP's and policies are centered on incident command and safety. Still there are no specific documents addressing the uniqueness of a suicide bomber event.

In general, these "high-risk" incidents also require the training of first responders, not only locally, but at a national level. As noted in the risk/vulnerability matrix, (Appendix B), many of the "high-risk" incidents are extremely rare events, especially the PBIED. Historically speaking, the only suicide attacks that the Americans have experienced since the Kamikazes of World War II, were the attacks of September 11, 2001. Unlike countries in the Middle-east, a true suicide bomber/PBIED event has never been seen on US soil. The closest event occurred in 1997 where the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the FBI had thwarted a plan of a twin suicide bomber event for the subways in New York City (Moaveni, 2002). Although not fully confirmed, the only and most current "suicide

bomber" event was the "Discovery Channel" incident that occurred on September 1, 2010. The rarity of such events makes it difficult to truly prepare and plan for them.

Training issues

Training for a PBIED scenario is available and conducted in the public safety realm, but it is usually limited to specialized units in law enforcement, such as the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Hazardous Devices Units (HDU). Organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) have created a number of job aids for law enforcement and HDU personnel to subsidize training and fill potential performance gaps. The issue with these job aids is that they are specific to those professions and do not directly address the fire/EMS organizations response to such incidents.

FEMA has recognized that fire and EMS organizations may find themselves dealing with acts of terrorism in the future. Based on this potential, FEMA understood that training and guidance would be required to assist fire/EMS organizations in the response phase of an incident. In general, public safety entities already possess the basic training in the response phase of a terrorist incident. Which as the author has already noted, is based on CBRNE and MCI management, but more advance and definitive training will be required to enhance a safer and successful operation.

The lack of any such event on American soil makes it difficult to train and create plans that cover all of the operational considerations of such a rare occurrence. The rarity of such events creates a potential performance gap that could potentially affect the outcome. Since training opportunities are scarce due to economic and logistical issues, including the time needed to get personnel trained; an innovative method to bridge this gap is needed. One of those methods is the creation of job aids that address these issues with general and specific information and details that will assist in the response of incidents. An example of a job aid created by FEMA, as part of a joint partnership with the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), the National Fire Academy (NFA) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) is

the “Emergency Response to Terrorism Job Aid” (ERTJA) in May of 2000. Since terrorism events are “infrequent, the situation is complex and the consequences for error are high.” This job aid, like any other, satisfies the basic requirements to bridge potential performance issues (Rorke, et al, n.d.). The FBI and DHS have also created job aids that assist fire and EMS responders, but it only addresses evacuation considerations based on the estimated size of the explosive device and the potential amount of high explosive material (Appendix C).

In today’s current economic conditions, training is a commodity that, although necessary, is looked upon more as a luxury than a necessity. A job aid only satisfies the basic knowledge requirement for such scenarios and may only lend recommendations for public safety personnel to follow during a complex incident. Although job aids may contain information on rare events such as a suicide bomber; training is still the best method to establish techniques and to assist in the creation of plans to handle these types of incidents.

Case-in-point, bomb technicians in the U.S. are very capable in handling a pipe bomb. This is because pipe bombs are currently the most prolific IED encountered by public safety HDU’s. With emerging threats such as suicide bombers and home-made explosives, the investment in training must be made. This will “minimize the learning curb and reaction time to the emerging threats” and will allow for a safer handling of rare incidents (Wilber, 2005). NBSCAB has also recognized the fact that there is a lack of preparation and training for suicide bombers and has established goals and objectives for members of the bomb squad community to meet this challenge (NBSCAB, 2010).

Emergency Management

Emergency Management (EM) has kept pace with the four basic demands of their job when dealing with all hazards; mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (FEMA, 2010a). EM’s modern day evolution on their four basic objectives can be traced back to the Civil Defense days and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration under the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (FEMA, 2010).

One of the most progressive documents for EM was FEMA's State and Local Guide for "All-Hazards Emergency Operations and Planning" (SLG-101). SLG-101 established what would be referred to as the "All Hazards" approach to emergency management. This was based on the philosophy that "the causes of emergencies vary greatly," but the effects do not (FEMA, 1996). The logic being elucidated to the Emergency Managers was that one could plan on the common effects, "rather than develop separate plans for each hazard" (FEMA, 1996).

Post Oklahoma City Bombing and September 11th events drove organizations to recognize that terrorism incidents require pre-planning and preparation beyond the natural and man-made disasters philosophy of EM. The difficulty has been that Emergency Managers (EM's) have been directed to take an "all hazards" approach to developing plans dealing with terrorist events. The problem with "treating all hazards the same in terms of planning resource allocation ultimately leads to failure" and creates short comings that potentially will make a bad situation worse (Blanchard, et al., 2007). This is where the creation of incident specific Incident Action Plans (IAP's), Functional Annexes (FA's), Hazard Specific Appendices (HAS's), SOP's and Checklists became an intricate part of pre-planning" (FEMA, 1996).

FEMA has continued the process of upgrading and updating the guidance that they provided EM's for planning. The most recent contribution to EM by FEMA was the development of the Comprehensive Planning Guide 101, "Development and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans" (CPG-101). CPG-101 is the replacement for SLG-101and although not a true mandate, FEMA strongly suggests that all future and updated EOP's follow this guide (FEMA, 2009). During personal communications with OFD's EM, Manual Soto (personal communication, May 13, 2010), confirmed that CPG-101 is "an un-funded mandate where future funding (such as grants) will be tied-in to meeting the requirements as they are laid out." FEMA's legal authority for controlling federal grant funding comes from the Stafford Act, which allows them to give incentives to all levels of EM to fulfill the requirements of CPG -101in their mitigation plans (FEMA, 2009).

FEMA continued to address plan development issues and provided recommendations for organizations to create annexes and SOP's that would be specific for jurisdictional hazards (FEMA, 2009). One of the goals for CPG 101 is to help EM's produce plans that will "facilitate coordination" with Federal government action under its authority and pursuant to the National Response Framework (NRF) and its "National Implementation Plan for the Global War on Terror" (FEMA, 2008).

The NRF addresses all catastrophic incidents that our nation faces and defines these incidents as: "any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions" (FEMA, 2008) . Based on the NFR's catastrophic incident definition, a suicide bomber in Central Florida, in or near a major theme park would fit in this classification. Imagine a mass casualty due to a suicide bomber in one of theme parks in Central Florida and the impact to the national moral and economy that such an event would have.

On May 1, 2010, the City of New York faced a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Time Square. Although this was not a suicide bomber incident, it was evident that the initial crews, fire and police, became highly suspicious of the vehicle as they approached. Their tactics of evacuation and securing the scene were well executed. This was due to the planning, training and experience that FDNY and NYPD had received and the number of events that they have endured. The fortunate side of this event was that the VBIED was poorly constructed and served as a dry run for all of NY's public safety entities to execute their plan (FBI law enforcement sensitive communication, May 3, 2010).

Take the above noted scenario and add an individual with the mission of being a suicide bomber to assure the proper detonation of his device. This would have been the first VBIED suicide bomber in the U.S. This is inferred based on the author's training and experience. Such an incident, where the device did not function as intended, would have given the individual the opportunity to withdraw, regroup and

correct the issue with the device, and then re-execute at a later date. He may have even been able to improvise at that very moment and caused a partial functioning of the device, inflicting death and destruction; maybe not at the full potential of the device, but enough to cause an international event.

Historically speaking, "Timothy McVeigh considered a suicide bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah federal office building in Oklahoma City before finding a plan that did not require suicide" (Hoffman, B., Brannan, D., Herren, E., Matthiessen, R., 2004). It was his ability to have an escape plan that averted his suicide mission. Unlike McVeigh, those who conduct such actions for martyrdom do so with death being part of their mission and reward. These individuals do not need an escape plan, therefore the implementation of the plan may only require improvisation or adaptation, such as diverting to softer targets. Failure is never considered and never an option for such cells and individuals because of their ability to think and improvise up to the last second.

Israeli Emergency Management and Civilian Preparation

On the international front, Israel is probably the icon of the modern day suicide bomber victim nation. Though, the current situation in Iraq has probably had more suicide bombers during the "peace keeping" operations, the key targets have been U.S. and Iraqi military and police. In Israel the main targets for the attacks have been the civilian population.

The success of suicide bombers to inflict heavy casualties has been well documented, especially during the declared Intifadas by radical Islamic organizations. This success is due to the reputation earned by suicide bombers. Many terrorism experts classified them as the ultimate smart bomb. Suicide bombers possess the ability to correct their course of action and improvise at the last minute to maximize the damage and death they are capable to inflict (Hoffman, 2003). Statistically speaking, during the period of 2000-2005, suicide bombers accounted for approximately .6% of all terrorist attacks in Israel, but accounted for 48.6% of all casualties in Israel (Romach and Moncaz, 2005).

The Israeli's have been successful on handling these incidents on many fronts due to experiencing so many suicide bombings. Put aside their interdiction programs, security perimeters, aggressive law enforcement and military tactics. The unfortunate fact is that suicide bombing incidents have added to their governmental and civilian culture of emergency preparedness. The Israeli culture has adopted a national preparedness concept to terrorism and suicide bombers that are second to none. To basically compare and contrast; the U.S. is preparedness concept is heavily entrenched in natural disasters preparedness such as hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes where the Israeli goes beyond such disasters to prepare its citizens for acts of terror.

The Israeli Emergency Management (EM) structure is unlike the U.S. model. Currently the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which is their military "plays a primary role" in EM. At one point in their history, the IDF and the Israeli Civil Defense were the only EM, but today their EM is continuing to evolve into a model that is closer to FEMA. Nevertheless, Israeli EM is still under their "Ministry of Defense" (MOD) rather than a separate entity such as FEMA. The Home Front Command (HFC), which is under the MOD, is the second tier of EM and consist of a consolidation of the Israeli version of Civil Defense, which, prior to the 1992 Gulf War was broken into three regional authorities (Rozdilsky, 2009). Understanding the necessity of a pure EM, the MOD formed the National Emergency Authority (NEA) in 2007 (Fendel, 2010). The NEA is emerging to be their true emergency management agency responsible for coordinating response efforts during states of emergency, including natural and man-made disasters (Fendel, 2010).

Another difference between the U.S. and the Israeli's involve the public information aspect of EM. At the HFC web-site, they have a section called "How to Act in an Emergency." The web-site has broken down EM topics for emergency preparedness to include advice and information for natural and manmade disasters. One of the web-pages is "How to Behave in a Terrorist Attack" which includes information on actions civilians need to take when they encounter a "suspicious person/suicide

bombings" (HFC, 2010). Although Americans can find preparedness advice for terrorism on the FEMA web-site there is no information on a suspicious person/suicide bombings.

Their history and geography also presents with a unique situation effecting EM. They are basically surrounded by ideological enemies. This has prompted their county to make military service compulsory for their civilians and the reason why the MOD is the primary governmental agency responsible for EM. The factors of history and compulsory military service have combine to create very militaristic philosophy of EM. The Israeli philosophy revolves around war where the whole country is looked upon as a battle front. This is where the core EM philosophy centers on the concept of the "defense of the rear area" (Rozdilsky, 2009). This concept arose on the day where Israel was recognized as an independent state when David Ben-Gurion was quoted as saying "The entire people are the army and the entire land is the front" (HFC, 2010a). Thus, preparation of the 'rear area' meant that the county as a whole needed to be prepared.

The preparedness of the civilian population is another concept where the U.S. and Israel differ. The Israeli's have taken preparedness to a level that would be impossible to replicate in the U.S. Per their Civil Defense doctrine; "Home Front Command views training the public as an obligation insofar as it is necessary in order to realize the goal of preparing the public for emergencies and protecting the public at such times" (HFC, 2010a). The Israeli's, also conduct an annual training program for all of their school children. According to the HFC's web-site:

> "Classes being trained are presented with a 5-lesson unit in the course of which various types of emergencies are examined along with the appropriate ways to cope with them. Furthermore, the educational system and the Home Front Command hold an annual national drill in all educational institutions in the country. Holding the drill constitutes the climax of any school's planning for emergencies of various kinds. (HFC, 2010a)"

This is a week long emergency drill that involves everyone in the country, from governmental agencies to the civilian population. One such example is the 'Turning Point' exercises. The latest exercise occurred on May of 2010 where the HFC held 'Turning Point 4'. Although the majority of the exercise was for governmental and public safety agencies to assess their preparedness, the third day of the exercise centered on the civilian population (Leyden, 2010). The emergencies ranged from natural and man made disasters, to war time attacks. The U.S. could never conduct a nation wide exercise for its civilians; the logistical requirements alone make it impossible.

Israeli Suicide Bomber Mitigation

The Israeli experience with suicide bombers is well documented. While suicide terrorism was not the prevalent tactic utilized during the first Intifada; approximately 150 suicide attacks occurred during the second Intifada (List of Palestinian suicide attacks, 2010). At the early onset of this form of terror tactics, all Israeli public safety entities responded based on their experience with MCI's caused by mortar or missile attack incidents. It was soon learned that this form of terrorism was much worse than expected. During these early years, EMS, Fire Service and Law Enforcement lacked a coordinated effort; which led to a number of issues involving items such as scene security and patient treatment.

An advantage that the Israeli's had to increase their efficiency during a suicide bombing was that their public safety entities are nationalized. The Israeli national EMS is known as the Magen David Adom (MDA) (Magen David Adom, 2010). Their law enforcement, the Israel Police Force (IPF), is also a national public safety entity (Israel Police Force, 2010). Although there are a number of fire departments in Israel, their training center is a national school. The nationalization of public safety entities provides for a national standard for planning, prevention, response and recovery efforts.

As with any new event, they initially did not take advantage of lessons learned from the early years of the Intifada's. The first events were considered isolated so therefore information was not shared initially. The HFC quickly recognized that suicide bombings were a new tactic that was going to be

exploited. The HFC then became proactive and as part of their mission, they worked toward coordinating the responsibilities and "to improve cooperation with emergency services (Police, EMS, and Fire), government ministries and local authorities" (Nuriel, 2002).

The HFC established national goals which include preparedness of civilians and to guide and direct all public safety entities. To meet these goals, they have established a number of responsibilities. Three of the main responsibilities of the HFC are to: "command and coordinate all forces involved in the incident, in order to optimize the national response", "develop a combined doctrines for all the forces involved in the incident", "carry out combined training at all levels of command" (Nuriel, 2002). They identified three basic elements for success: simplicity, drilling and lessons learned. In the public safety arena, the IDF engages in a number of activities including national guidelines for "conventional and non-conventional threats" (Nuriel, 2002). This includes training and conducting exercises for all emergency services. It is this type of organization and planning, at the national level, which has helped the Israeli's in their mitigation of suicide bomber incidents.

To bring the Israeli preparedness into perspective, the author reviewed an incident that occurred on February 4, 2008, in a small city named Dimona. In this incident a suicide bomber had detonated a belt bomb that was strapped to his body in an open market. As first responders began to work the scene, a "Samaritan team" (a nurse and doctor from a near-by hospital) initiated care on a victim/patient. While stabilizing the patient, he began to move. The assessment continued and while removing clothing from him to complete a medical assessment, it was discovered that he was wearing an explosive belt. This had been the second suicide bomber, believed to be intended for the first responders (Palmieri, et al, 2009). They immediately sounded the alarm of the second bomber and dragged another patient to safety. A law enforcement officer inside of the hot zone immediately neutralized the threat. The officer took action based on his training and established policy (Palmieri, et al, 2009). This officer was credited for saving the lives of the first responders and civilians.

This incident demonstrated the need to have proper training and a coordinated plan between all first responders. The "Samaritan team" recognized what was occurring and reacted in a manner that was consistent with their training. This team sounded the alarm and pulled another near-by victim to safety while evacuating. The other first responders also evacuated to hard cover and once the terrorist was neutralized, the device was rendered safe and re-entry into the hot zone was made. It was the training and experience of the officer and all of the first responders that averted a larger loss of life by being able to execute a plan and minimize the delay in time.

U.S. National to local mitigation and planning

Since the U.S. has not had an actual modern day incident, the country is left with lessons learned from foreign countries, such as Israel. The closest planning for such an event are found in documents such as SLG-101, CPG-101 and the NRF. These documents are only recommendations to local, state, and tribal governments to have some form of a plan that addresses acts of terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Technically, a suicide bomber is a WMD, but when one searched under the topic of WMD's; CBRNE types of plans are consistently found.

At the federal level, there are a multitude of agencies and organizations that are dedicated to the mitigation of such events. From the CBRNE realm, Civil Support Teams (CST's) are established in every state in the country. Their role is to support and augment local and regional resources dealing with a WMD (WMD-CST, 2003). These assets require activation by authorities at the state and federal level. Their response time, from notification to being on scene is in the excess of 3-4 hours (WMD-CST, 2003).

The occurrence of a MCI is another scenario where local organizations can attain additional resources. The Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (D-MAT) are also regional resources that can be tapped to assist in a mass casualty incident. This team also has a similar issue with their response times. Though excellent resources for major catastrophic incidents, they are of little use during the response

phase of a suicide bomber, unless it involves an 'Oklahoma City' or '9-11' scenario of an extended campaign.

Contact was made with a number of major metropolitan departments throughout the country to check if any department had any specific plans for a PBIED. All of the departments that responded had similar SOP's and the same basic philosophy as the District of Columbia Fire Department (DCFD). According to DCFD Assistant Fire Chief of Operations, Lawrence S. Schultz, he advised that DCFD did not have a specific plan. He reported that DCFD has addressed the suicide bomber issue in their "Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG) for Bombing Incidents" which contains general considerations for a PBIED. Chief Shultz stated that DCFD would use "this (SOG for Bombing Incidents) in conjunction with our WMD Response Plan and Mass Casualty Response Plan; each of these plans holds a piece of the puzzle" for managing a suicide bombing incident. (Lawrence S. Schultz, personal communication, September 20, 2010).

In order to get the local perspective of the first responders the author chose to conduct interviews with representatives of Orange County's Sheriff's Office SWAT, Fire and Rescue Command Officers and Orlando Police Department "High Risk" incident command staff. These representatives were selected for four primary reasons. First, was their connection and understanding to the local potential and need for planning. Second, was the training and experience they have in handling critical incidents in the region. Third, is the fact that a PBIED incident will tax the responding agencies, since both the City and the County have a mutual aid agreement and would respond to assist each other, it is important to establish their current philosophy for response. Finally, due to their influence and understanding of the nature of issues revolved around local response and planning. These interviews were non-structured and open dialog meetings. The author believed that this format would create a free-flow exchange of concepts and perceptions that would be used by both sides to draw understanding and conclusions about PBIED response.

On September 30, 2010, the author met with Orange County Sheriff's Office (FL) SWAT Sergeant (Sgt.) Mitchell Shaban and discussed the suicide bomber scenario. During the interview Sgt. Shaban stated that "time to mobilize a SWAT team and deploy" them would be too late to have a true impact on the initial response phase of an incident. Sgt. Shaban then discussed an incident that occurred in 2007. He stated that in 2007 a suspicious person walked into a bank and told the occupants that he was wearing a suicide vest. Sgt. Shaban stated that the SWAT Team did deploy, but that it was the "work of the patrol units" that secured the scene, completed an evacuation and secured a perimeter. He stated that the reason that lethal force was not used was due to a number of factors. The first was the fact that the suspect was contained and the life safety factor was only limited to the suspect. Second, was the fact that through communication with the suspect and technology used by the Hazardous Devices Unit, it was determined that the suspect was mentally ill and did not possess any hazardous device (Mitchell Shaban, personal communication, September 30, 2010).

During the interview the author presented the concept that the "lone patrol officer" will be the difference in the outcome of an incident were a suicide bomber had not had the opportunity to detonate himself. Sgt. Shaban also agreed with the concept and added that the training for the average deputy was limited, but that SWAT did have training in the application of lethal force on a suicide bomber. Sgt. Shaban was also asked "if there were any plans to create a coordinated effort with Fire/EMS" to enter a scene (post-blast PBIED) to provide lethal cover for crew working in the hot zone. He stated that the concept of "marrying-up deputies with the fire guys" had not been discussed, but now that this concept was presented to him, that it may need to be discussed in the very near future (Mitchell Shaban, personal communication, September 30, 2010).

From September 21 to September 23, 2010, the author attended a Unified Command Course being offered by the Orange County Fire Rescue Department (OCFDR) and the Orange County Sheriff's Office (OCSO). While attending this course I was able to interview Assistant Chiefs (A/C) Brian Morrow and James Holton along with Battalion Chief (B/C) David Provo and Captain (Capt) Richard

Saez. During the interview with these gentlemen, the suicide bomber scenario was discussed. They all consistently stated that there were no written plans. The closest SOG's their department had were for WMD's, Mass Casualties and "scenes of violence where there was a reasonable expectation of harm" (A/C Morrow, personal communication, September 22, 2010). B/C Provo (personal communication September 22, 2010) stated that, "we would probably work with the Sheriff's Office like we would for an SWAT scene." Capt. Saez stated that, "each EMS Captain carried two ballistic vests that were used to support SWAT operations," and that theoretically they could be used by a limited number of their personnel if such an incident would occur (Capt. Saez, personal communication September 22, 2010).

Both A/C's Holton and Morrow emphasized the fact that the "command and control of the scene" would be imperative. Chief Holton (personal communication, September 22, 2010) stated "that's why we have this type of course," to have an understanding between the key responders of a critical incidents and minimize loss of life.

On November 9, 2010, at 1000 hours, the author had the opportunity to communicate with OPD's Deputy Chief Larry Zwieg, High-Risk Incident Commander; Captain Jeffery Odell, SWAT Commander; Captain Carl Metzger, Emergency Response Team Commander, and Captain Luis Tanzi, Emergency Services Unit (ESU) Commander. These gentlemen were asked the following: "Are there any plans to have an aggressive presence in-side the hot zone (ground zero) for such an event? Are there tactical considerations for clearing an access point (point of entry and egress) for victims? Has there been any consideration of 'paring-up cops and firefighters' for scene security reasons? Has there been any training with the 'street cops' to be mindful of secondary devices, second suicide bomber, etc…?"

This discussion was an open dialog discussing PBIED's with an emphasis on a secondary device or secondary PBIED. The author then provided information of the 2008 Dimona, Israel, twin suicide bomber incident. This scenario was used as the major point that drove the discussion. According to Chief Zwieg, this scenario had not been discussed in detail, although members of specialized units such as

SWAT and ESU have attended specialized courses. These courses included IED recognition courses and the "Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents" course prepared by the New Mexico Institute and Technology, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (NMT Course) .

Captain Odell stated that a plan to "pairing-up cops" and firefighters had not been planned. Both the author and Captain Odell agreed that the individual paring of a law enforcement officer and firefighter was not logistically possible. Captain Odell also stated that the tradition tactic for a bomb scene would be to deploy officers in a concentric perimeter where an inner and outer perimeter would be created. The officers would be given the mission of security and directing victims to EMS.

Captain Metzger also stated that there were members of his team, ERT, that had received some training in bomb recognition, but there was a definite need for training as many patrol officers as possible. It was also mentioned that members of the special teams (SWAT, ERT and ESU) were assigned to the patrol division and that many had some of the training. As far as a policy, he indicated that the policy was geared to lethal force. He was also very poignant in his point about the ability of a patrol officer to make the assessment and decision to take lethal force action. He emphasizes how critical it would be to have the patrol officers trained for such decision making.

Captain Tanzi stated that the majority of the ESU had completed bomb recognition training and had attended the NMT Course. He stated that ESU was the Haz-Mat team for OPD and that mutual training with OFD's Haz-Mat team has been conducted for WMD and clandestine labs. Capt. Tanzi stated that ESU personnel's' training was highly influenced by WMD training. Both Capt. Tanzi and the author felt that it was an operational advantage to have OPD's ESU as a resource.

The discussion then focused on the command and control aspect of such an incident. All personnel felt comfortable that based on past practice, both OFD and OPD would work well together. Conversing, all personnel also understood the value of having a basic operational plan so that personnel through both chains of command would have a basic understanding of each entity's capability, actions

and operations. The author then produced a basic operational schematic of such a scene and discussed what actions would be needed (Appendix D). During the discussion that ensued the importance of the security of "Ground 0" was emphasized. This security included a sweep for secondary devices, PBIED's and potential shooters. Added to this was the importance of clearing and securing an access and evacuation route, the triage, treatment and transport location and the command post. The comment was made by Capt. Odell that the command post (CP) would not be so close to the scene. We agreed that an incident such as this would require a Unified CP, but the operational divisions and their CP's would theoretically be located in or near the warm zone, at the minimum. It was the clearing of the hot zone and an access route that would require a combination of personnel from both departments to expeditiously conduct a search. An IED recognition class for both departments would be critical.

Chief Zwieg interjected during the meeting and emphasized making it a priority to begin some form of bomb recognition training for all department personnel. He also pointed out the necessity to get this training included in the department's annual recertification training. This would ensure that all law enforcement personnel would get the training (Chief Larry Zwieg and high-risk unit commanders, personal communications, November 9, 2010).

At the conclusion of the meeting the author was provided with OPDs' Hazardous Materials Team, Explosive Materials, and their Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Procedures (P&P). These documents were reviewed for PBIED related information. Although there are no specific references to a PBIED in their P&P's; the author believes that OPD possess a strong foundation that would allow them to operate adequately during such an incident. This is credit to the fact that OPD does have a Haz-Mat Team and members of their command staff who have completed WMD and other specialized training. Having strong P&P's and personnel with specialized training will have a positive impact in the event a PBIED incident were to happen today in Orlando.

Assessing the information obtained through the interviews, the author concluded that the PBIED issue is one where no local (City of Orlando and Orange County) planning has taken place. Plans are in place in the form of WDM, IED, MCI and crime scene SOP's, but there is no specificity for PBIED. The author did get the impression that all of those interviewed did perceive that the lack of a plan was an issue. In the case of OPD, they perceived the potential short fall and have begun to take proactive measures by providing an IED recognition class for their personnel.

At the authors own department, OFD, there are no specific plans. Such an incident would require a synergy of the WMD, Bomb and MCI SOP's. It has been mostly 'tactical talk', having the 'what if this happens' type of discussion. The biggest advantage that OFD has is that the city's Hazardous Devices Technicians are part of the department. This is a huge asset because the technical experts will be a part of the scene under the immediate command and control of OFD within minutes of an incident. Regardless, guidance in the form of policy and department wide training is still lacking.

At a regional level (Central Florida) there has been some discussion of such a scenario, yet except for a training exercise that took place in 2008, very little planning has occurred. The author took part in the 2008 exercise that had the elements of a mass casualty, IED's, active shooters, and suicide bombing, but to date has not seen any after action report or recommendations materialize. In this exercise ICS and Unified Command were used, but issues involving communications, organizational capabilities and tactics were evident. If this were a true incident, the lessons learned would have been obtained through the tragic consequences of the lack of scenario specific SOP's or plans. The only positive fact was the resilience, drive and motivation that was apparent by all teams and organizations to sacrifice and work toward saving the lives of those in peril.

Two exercises, common issues.

Currently, the most common tactic among Fire and EMS departments is the use of WMD, MCI and Bomb SOPs to mitigate such a scenario. Law Enforcement also has some commonality in their

response with the use of their own Bomb SOP's and the manner in which they would secure the scene and their individual lethal force policies. These tactics were all too obvious in an exercise conducted on July 28, 2007 at the New Castle Airport in Delaware and the January of 2008 exercise in Lake County, Florida.

These exercises were multi-scene incidents where suicide bombers and secondary suicide bombers were part of the scenario. They were conducted with the full array of responders to include local, state and federal law enforcement (FBI), HDU's, fire and EMS departments. They also required the use of a Unified Command for each scene with an overall Area Command for the whole incident.

At the conclusion of the exercises a number of issues, which would be common among public safety organizations, were apparent. According to Dwayne Day, coordinator of the New Castle Airport exercise and author of a post-graduate thesis titled, "A Uniformed Approach to National Suicide Bomber Incident Response and Recovery," some of the short-falls found included: (a) "Many agencies lacked plans for integrated response operations;" (b) "Safe standoff distances, perimeters, and exclusionary zones for suicide bombings should be incorporated into standard operating procedures of all law enforcement, fire department, and emergency medical personnel." and (c) "There was no clear indication of when command was established, who the Incident Commander was, or where the incident command post was located. There was no transition from incident command to unified command. No incident action plan was developed, and a communications unit leader was never identified. This lack of a strategic plan and tactical objectives led to confusion, this in turn led to freelancing at the incident site. Instead of having a methodical approach to incident stabilization, responders lacked direction and clear goals. The early development of an incident action plan upon arrival at an incident site should be emphasized" (Day, 2008).

Probably one of the most stunning facts was that a delay of approximately 78 minutes occurred for rescuers to make contact with victims of one of the bombing scenes due to the uncertainty of a

secondary bomber and lack of scene safety. This was due to fire/EMS waiting for law enforcement to deploy a SWAT team to clear the scene with HDU's (Day, 2008).

The Lake County exercise of 2008 had very similar shortfalls. The author was placed in command of the HDU of OFD and paired up with the Kissimmee Police Department, Fl. (KPD) Special Weapons and Tactic (SWAT) team for the exercise. Although communication and cooperation with the KPD SWAT was excellent as a team, there was a huge shortfall in the communication with the overall command. The author was able to survey the command posts early in the scenario. It was noted that there was a fire service, EMS and law enforcement command post created. The survey of the command posts were limited, but during the survey it was found that the law enforcement command post had an asset that was unknown by the author prior to the survey. This asset was the live feed from a Sheriff Office helicopter to the law enforcement command post.

This asset became a key assessment tool for the mitigation of a mission that was given to the KPD team. A request of an aerial reconnaissance of the scene was made and granted. The reconnaissance revealed at least two IED's that were left as booby-traps for the responders. This resource allowed for planning an approach to the scene. Once the mission was completed the author reported back the findings to the HDU command post. One of the issues reported was the discovery of a remote control IED (cell phone). The HDU command post advised that he had, "heard that another team had discovered the same type of device at another location." This information, along with other intelligence was not passed on to the KPD team. The team leader then insisted that the command post communications officer notify all HDU and SWAT teams of the intelligence that was obtained during the mission.

The fact that intelligence gathered throughout the scenario by other teams was not passed on, showed that there was a lack of an Area Command and information sharing was hampered by the lack in the unity of all of the command divisions. This also demonstrated that there was no overall operational

plan and that the IAP created throughout the scenario remained fluid with shortfalls being consistent with those of the New Castle Airport exercise.

Suicide bombings are coming to American soil. The question is not when or where, but how prepared are American first responders? Currently the vast majority, if not all first responder organizations, have a "patchwork of inconsistent localized" plans that lack specificity for suicide bombings (Force Science Institute, 2008). This lack of planning creates a risk to the first responders and the citizens; and if it remains unchecked, could cost an increase in casualties and fatalities (Force Science Institute, 2008).

Unlike our counterparts in Israel, we lack the experience, knowledge and training for handling a PBIED. The U.S. is a huge patchwork of individual public safety entities, where in Israel; all public safety entities are all nationalized. This allows Israel the ability to have a national protocol for mitigation. Though their abilities to handle these incidents are well orchestrated, their system is nearly impossible to duplicate in the U.S.

What is needed is a plan based on the best practices from countries that have dealt with these situations. Both Israel and Great Britain have experienced PBIED's and both have had plans they credit for successful mitigation and minimizing loss of life. Although not discussed in the literature review, the author did find important information that will be used in the discussion portion of this ARP on the July 7, 2005 incident in London. It was noted that the British did take lessons learned from Israel to develop plans used for their incident. The author will base his recommendation for the City of Orlando on the lessons from Israel, Great Britain, and both the New Castle Airport exercise in 2007 and the Lake County, Fl. exercise of 2008.

Procedures

This applied research project used an action research method to create recommendations and a draft policy and procedure for the OFD that dealt with a suicide bomber incident. The author felt that it

was imperative to review incidents of suicide bombings. This review involved a historical research methodology to assist in understanding a number of factors involved in the mitigation of these incidents. A short reference was made to VBIED's; for the purpose of stressing that such incidents have occurred and were contemplated here in the U.S. as a suicide bomber intent ("9-11" and Oklahoma City bombing, respectfully).

The author began this research by conducting a search for material at the National Emergency Training Center's Learning Resource Center (NETC-LRC). The author was able to find articles from a number of fire, EMS and Emergency Management (EM) trade journals. The articles from the fire and EMS journals discussed CBRNE types of incidents, for the most part. While EM journals did provide information on planning and mitigation for suicide bombers and case study material they did not provide any specific planning guides for suicide bombers for first responders. Terrorism guides and recommendation that were found and reviewed for inclusion into the recommendation and draft policy.

The author then reviewed documents and text books from the FBI's Hazardous Devices School (HDS) (Law Enforcement Sensitive material). The author has access to Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO On-Line), a secure web-site for law enforcement personnel and bomb technicians. A search through the LEO On-Line web site was conducted for suicide bombers. There was a vast amount of information on suicide bombers and mitigation, but the material was geared heavily toward law enforcement and HDU personnel.

A search on the LEO On-Line web-site was conducted on two recent incidents. The author was able to obtain information on the VBIED (non-suicide bomber) that occurred on May 1, 2010 in Time Square New York. The other search was for the "Discovery Channel" incident that occurred on September 1, 2010 when James Lee entered the building with, what was reported to be, pipe-bombs strapped on his person. Information on both incidents was limited, and the information that was obtained was labeled as law enforcement sensitive information.

While conducting research on this topic, the author attempted to contact 573 Executive Fire Officer's and current EFO students to obtain information specific about suicide bombers. Out of the 87 that responded to an e-mail sent on August 2, 2010, requesting any information reference 'suicide bomber' SOP's, policy and procedures or plans, everyone advised that they did not have specific plans. Each organizational representative, with the exception of one, did state that their organization did have plans or SOP's involving MCI's and bombing, but not specific for suicide bombers. The only exception mentioned was Mr. John Staub with the U.S. Air Force. He as able to provide a power-point presentation created by a Mr. August Vernon titled "Suicide Bomber Planning & Response", which included considerations for first responders. This information was also labeled as "public safety sensitive" material and consisted of recommendations for first responders.

The author reviewed the State of Florida's Emergency Management web site and searched for any specific documents, but none were found. A terrorism annex was obtained and found to be consistent with the City of Orlando's Emergency Management plans, which indicated the need to have terrorism annexes as part of their plan. Contact was also made with Emergency Managers in Central Florida with Seminole, Orange, Lake, Volusia, Brevard and Osceola Counties as well as the cities of Orlando, Sanford, Daytona Beach and Kissimmee to check if they had any form of a plan that was specific for suicide bombings. All of the organizations stated that they did not have such plans and both Seminole and Volusia counties referred the author to their Sheriff's office.

Since there were no documented cases of PBIED's detonations in the U.S. the author was unable to conduct a case study for an American event. The author then began an internet search for key words that would assist him in obtaining information on suicide bombings. Some of the key words used, in combinations, were: "suicide bomber," "response", "EMS", "Israel", "fire service," "planning", and "training" to name a few. Using these key words, especially coupled with "Israel" produced a number of resources that were used in this research. This included enough material to conduct a case study that was used as the basis of questions to those interviewed.

The author then conducted research into any federal government documents that related to planning requirements. A web search using the "google.com/unclesam" web site was conducted. This web site is specific for government documents, at all levels, and was used extensively to obtain the most current version and archived versions of FEMA documents relating to planning. The author was able to obtain copies of FEMA's CPG-101, SLG-101 and related documents.

Interviews were conducted with Orange County Fire Rescue and Sheriff Departments personnel along with City of Orlando's Police Department personnel and the Emergency Manager. The basic discussion with these personnel dealt with planning for such events. Contact was made with the regional representative for the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI), Deputy Sheriff Lance Conner with the Hillsboro Sheriff's Department to get information on any regional planning that involved a Unified Command concept or plan for a suicide bomber. He advised that he was unaware of any sort of plans in the region, which included Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee and the Virgin Islands.

The author also used his training and experience as it related to a major training exercise that took place in Lake County, FL in the spring of 2008. The review of an exercise conducted in New Castle, DE in 2007 was also conducted. The information from both exercises, along with the information obtained in the interviews with OPD High Risk Incident command team leaders served as a basis for much of this ARP findings and recommendation.

The author attempted to contact the Magen David Adom (MDA), the national EMS for Israel. Contact was made with local representative of the "Friends of MDA", but they were unable to provide any information. The City of New York Fire Department (FDNY) was also contacted to check into any policies or procedures they had in scene management. This query was met with negative results when FDNY advised that their SOP's were available for purchase and upon review of the order form, no specific SOP's were listed.

Limitations

There were numerous limitations involving this research. The most significant was the fact that a vast majority of the information on suicide bomber mitigation was specific for the law enforcement and hazardous devices community. Multiple documents and articles were available involving legal issues, such as the use of lethal force and profiling suspected bombers. A manual on suicide bomber scenarios has been published through the FBI, but this document is very specific for the bomb technicians to consider. The majority of this information was classified as "law enforcement sensitive" which made it difficult to refer to or cite verbatim.

Since a PBIED has never been documented to date (the "Discovery Channel" incident has yet to be confirmed) in the U.S., the author had to rely on lessons learned in Israel and from the July 7, 2005 London, England incident. The author attempted to qualify the Israeli experiences as being a model, by doing a comparison and contrasting with U.S. emergency services model of mitigation. The limiting factor was the inability to make direct contact with Israeli organizations such as the MDA.

The information found at the NETC-LRC was also limited for the goal of the author. Though there was sufficient information on the EM side of such events, the mitigation by EMS and fire services was limited. Using the search engine on the NETC-LRC's web site, a search for key words of "suicide" and "bomber" showed only one Executive Fire Officer APR had been published that had a portion dedicated to suicide bombing.

The author was also limited in the ability to expound upon the July 7, 2005 London, England in the literature review. The concern was that creating a comparison and contrasting involving a third entity could be counter productive and confusing. The London incident is only touched up in the discussion portion of the ARP to serve as an example of a county that developed plans based on the lessons learned from Israel.

Assumptions

The most significant assumption the author had was that there was more planning at local and state levels for suicide bombers. At the federal level, FEMA released the "Responding to Incidents of National Consequences, Recommendations for America's Fire and Emergency Services Based on The Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents" report in May of 2004 (FEMA, 2004, p.1). This report provided a review of the events of "9-11" and the Anthrax incident in Boca Raton, Fl. The purpose of the report was to provide fire and emergency services departments "across America to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major multijurisdictional local incidents that have national consequences and may involve national resource" (FEMA, 2004, p. 7). The author had figured that with such a document, there would be clearer and more specific local and state plans.

Another assumption was that in the vast amount of information dealing with the WMD's, that there may have been some information on PBIED's. This was not the case. These documents included some specificity toward the chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear and explosive ("CBRNE") events. Although, a PBIED incident would fall under an explosive incident criterion, the other facets of this type of event make it unique. There was only some minimal referencing found in WMD documents, but no specific planning considerations were available.

The author still assumes that there may be incident specific plans in place somewhere in the country, but that either this information is considered too sensitive to release or contact had not been made with the appropriate organizations.

Definition of terms

1. Hazardous Device Technician: synonymous with "Bomb Tech" or technician. A person who has completed the Federal Bureau of Investigations Hazardous Devices School.
2. Hazardous Device Unit: synonymous with "Bomb Squad." Specialized public safety units dedicated to rendering safe IED's.

3. Home-made explosives (HME): an explosive made from commercially available materials/chemicals. Usually the chemical mixture is very unstable and unpredictable. Very prone to accidental detonation. Example: Tri-Acetone/Tri-Peroxide (TATP)
4. Improvise Explosive Device (IED): any object/container that has been modified from its intended use to contain explosive materials and designed to detonate. Also can be referred to as a "Hazardous Device"
5. Intifada (انتفاضة *intifāḍa(t)*): is an Arabic word which literally means "shaking off," though it is usually translated into English as "uprising" or "resistance" or "rebellion". It is often used as a term for popular resistance to oppression (Intifada, 2010). This was also the term used in the mandates by radical Islamic fundamentalist to wage a terror war on Israel.
6. Man Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS): A shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapon. Also known as a heat seeking missile. Most commonly know example is the American made "Stinger."
7. Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED): synonymous with suicide bomber. An IED that is on a person's body who has the criminal intent to do kill and void his/her life in the process.
8. Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED): any vehicle that used as an IED. To include bicycles, motorcycles, aircraft, ect… May or may not be a suicide bomber.
9. Explosive Train: the process of initiated the main explosive charge of a device or explosive with the use of other explosives that have a higher sensitivity for detonation.

Results

The primary purpose of this ARP was to create a SOP that will provide support for an EOP and to provide guidance for OFD personnel during a suicide bomber incident. To satisfy this purpose the author assessed FEMA's CPG-101 and the City of Orlando's EMP in relation to PBIED's incidents. This assessment also included a historic review, personal training and experience of PBIED's as part of the literature review to draw conclusions in support of this ARP's goal. The goal was to find a solution for the problem. This included creating the appropriate documents in the form of SOP's for OFD and P&P's for OPD for a PBIED. To accomplish this, the author answered the following questions:

Research question one. What are the elements for the creation of an EOP?

By definition an "Emergency Operation Plan" (EOP) is a plan created by a tribal, local, or state governmental body or large organizations that address various factors involved in handling a large scale emergency. Although superseded by CPG-101, FEMA's SLG-101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning provides the general guidance and concepts for public and private entities engaged in some form of "Emergency Management." On review of SLG-101, the author believes that it provides a good, basic explanation of an EOP and its elements.

According to SLG-101; an EOP "describe who will do what, as well as when, with what resources, and by what authority: before, during, and immediately after an emergency" (FEMA, 1996, Foreword). SLG-101 then details the elements of an EOP as follows: (a) "Assigns responsibility to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions at projected times and places in an emergency that exceeds the capability or routine responsibility of any one agency, e.g., the fire department. (b) Sets forth lines of authority and organizational relationships, and shows how all actions will be coordinated. (c) Describes how people and property will be protected in emergencies and disasters. (d) Identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available within the jurisdiction or by agreement with other jurisdictions--for use during response and recovery operations. (e) Identifies steps to address mitigation concerns during response and recovery activities."

As a public document, an EOP also cites its legal basis, states its objectives, and acknowledges assumptions" (FEMA, 1996, p. 1-1). The guidance provided by SLG-101 will assist in the creation of SOP's that can be added as a reference in and annex under CPG-101's recommendations.

Research question two. What are the requirements, per FEMA's CPG-101 for a suicide bombing incidents?

As documented in the "Introduction and Overview" section of CPG-101, FEMA does not establish an immediate requirement to follow CPG-101, but it strongly suggests that future rewrites of EOP follow the recommendations as presented (FEMA, 2009, Intro-2). With that said; City of Orlando's Emergency Manager, Manuel Soto (personal communication, September 31, 2010) stated that FEMA recommendations such as CPG-101 were figuratively, "unfunded mandates where monies (federal grants) were used as carrots to motivate departments for comply with their (FEMA) recommendations".

CPG-101's purpose is to provide guidance to Emergency and Homeland Security Managers to create and "maintain viable all-hazard, all-threat emergency plans" (FEMA, 2009, Intro-1). These plans must reflect the actions that an organization may take when faced with critical incidents, including threats or hazards that may be of a unique nature for their community (FEMA, 2009, Intro-1).

Although not spelled out in CPG-101, a plan for a suicide bomber, or at least an SOP that may be referred to in the EOP, could theoretically satisfy the 'requirement'. To fulfill this requirement, each of the mitigation stakeholders; law enforcement, fire/EMS and public works, at the minimum, must have a SOP.

Research question three. How have other fire departments addressed suicide bomber incidents?

The U.S. has yet to face a true PBIED event. This factor has made it difficult for organizations to create specific plans of dealing with these events. So we, as a country, are left to learn and plan based on events that have occurred in foreign countries. Vincent Mulray of the Philadelphia Fire Department used the suicide bombing incidents in London, England on July 7, 2005, for his EFO ARP dealing with the rail system and to make recommendations to prepare for such an incident at a transportation center. The author also had to use the Dimona, Israel incident to assist in drawing conclusions.

Based on the information obtained from the literature review, replies from 87 EFO graduates and candidates, internet searches and discussion with regional peers there was one consistent theme, it was that no one has a specific plan for a suicide bomber. Every individual that replied to the authors queries,

with the exception of one, consistently replied that they all had SOP's that dealt with MCI's, WMD's, bomb incidents and scenes of violence. The exception came from John Staub, USAF, who provided information of a training program provided to Air Force personnel.

The author made contact with a number of representatives from major metropolitan departments such as the District of Colombia Fire Department (DCFD), Shreveport Fire Department, Louisiana, Fort Worth Fire Department, Texas, to name a few, to ascertain if they had a suicide bomber plan (Appendix E) for partial list of departments contacted). Every department advised that they did not have a specific plan, but had plans on WMD's, MCI's and bombs. DCFD was the only department where there was a specific section of their bomb SOP dedicated to PBIED's. The author found that the information contained in their SOP was probably the best plan available. Yet it is unknown if there is a specific Unified Command plan in place for all first responders.

The current mind set is that MCI, WMD, bomb and scenes of violence SOP's, as a conglomeration of practices, will cover a suicide bombing event. The author offers this opinion; these SOP's will definitely cover the essence of a post-blast suicide bomber, but the dynamics of a coordinate effort by all first responders and stakeholders is still needed. As discussed earlier in this ARP, the nature of a PBIED has the potential to be a hybrid of an incident that would require some specificity in organization and planning.

Research question four. How has OFD addressed potential suicide bombing incidents?

OFD has addressed this issue the same as any other fire department. They use the combination of MCI, bomb, and WMD SOP's and policies to mitigate an event. OFD, unlike the majority of the U.S. fire services, has the bomb squad as part of their department. This is a great advantage to OFD because the bomb SOP is written with the assistance of bomb technicians. There is also a closer relationship between the bomb tech and the fire/EMS incident commander.

OFD also has an "Incident Commanders (IC) IED" power-point that is on the district commander's mobile computer terminal. This power-point has a number of tabs that the IC can scroll through and obtain information relating to the command structure, worksheets and operational procedures. It has a default setting where the IC is reminded of the potential of secondary devices (Appendix F).

Another advantage is that the EM for the City of Orlando falls under the control of the fire department. This is because he is in constant contact with OFD, either through normal communications means, cell phone, and pager or in directed contact with personnel with radio communications. The EM also has an office at the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) which is housed in the same building as the city's police and fire department communication center.

During a personal communication with the EM, Manny Soto, he described the advantage that he had for forecasting needs and "getting the ball rolling" on a number of items needed for an active shooter event like what occurred on November 6, 2009. Mr. Soto stated that having his office in the same building as the communication center gave him the ability to report to the dispatch center and monitor the events in real time. This afforded him the opportunity to contact local churches to be used as evacuation points for persons inside and outside of the building. He was able to contact key stakeholders in the community to have them standby to provide services, such as the Red Cross with their rehab-unit for civilians and Public Works for barricades. Mr. Soto advised that having the ability to monitor in real time was key to assisting him in mentally preparing for a trigger point to have an EOC activation. This also helped in not being too premature, as would have been the case if he was not monitoring. Mr. Soto stated that during this event, he was getting ready to "pull-the trigger" on the activation, but once he understood the events as they unfolded he was able to hold off.

The unfortunate circumstance is that OFD has no true plan. The bomb squad has also suffered from the lack of aggressive pro-active training. As the author mentioned, there is are a number of job aids that bomb squad members have access to, but these documents are reviewed and stored for future reference. Though one can get the impression that the author is being overly critical of OFD, this

is not the case. The fire service in general is creature of nature and reaction. Since there has been no PBIED detonation in the U.S. there is no plan. The author has found very little to nothing that directly addresses suicide bombings specifically for a unified response by all stakeholders. In other words, OFD is just a microcosm of the U.S. fire services.

Research question five. How could a single suicide bomber annex to the City of Orlando's EOP address OFD's and OPD's need?

By the interpretation of CPG-101, what would be required is a "Hazard-, Threat-, or Incident-Specific Annex" (FEMA, 2009, p113). These annexes "focus on special planning needs" that are dictated by the specific or single hazard that needs to be addressed (FEMA, 2009, p113). The format of such annexes may be in the form of an SOP.

Currently the City of Orlando's Emergency Management Plan (EMP) conforms to state and federal recommendations and requirements. Based on this fact, the EMP and the EOP's contained there in; a unified "Incident Specific Annex" (ISA) would address the suicide bomber scenario. Mr. Soto (personal communication, September 30, 2010) stated that SOP's from OFD and OPD need in place and properly documented in the ISA. As the author documented earlier, OPD does have a SOP that addresses "High Risk Incidents." This SOP could be edited and the inclusion of suicide bomber considerations be added to fulfill the ISA's needs. OFD also has a SOP that deals with bomb scenes and would require the addition of a PBIED section.

OFD, OPD and EM need to consider an intertwining of SOP's to create an operational plan for a PBIED incident. The delineation of roles and responsibilities of each organization needs to be established and understood by all parties. For example, the Bomb Squad is in OFD and is under the fire department command and they are also cross-sworn with OPD. In a suicide bomber scenario the lines of responsibility could become blurred when it comes to the Bomb Squad responsibility and operations at

the scene. This is an issue that can only be addressed through a unified "Suicide Bomber" ISA with clearly understood SOP's for both law enforcement and fire/EMS.

Discussion

Acts of terrorism occur on a daily basis, but Americans tend to see it as a foreign issue. It touches this country via media attention when there is a high death toll or when it involves Americans. Stories out of Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka are common place and although horrific, the American public for the most part is indifferent, unless it hits close to home. For a short time after September 11, 2001, the whole world, including Americans were exceptionally aware and took terrorism as a serious threat.

This period of exceptional terror awareness went to the extreme of paranoia. Most Americans can remember the rush to stock pile the antibiotic Cipro, due to the Anthrax scare in 2001. The Anthrax incidents and 9-11 led to an increase of public safety calls for services that turned out to be unfounded. For example, in 2001, OFD units responded to a suspicious powder on a facility at the international airport. The powder was located in the coffee break room next to the coffee maker. The powder turned out to be spilled, non-dairy creamer. Calls for suspicious persons, vehicles, packages and incidents were also on the rise during this time and for the most part were not warranted.

Yet, complacency has set in at all levels of American society. According to Mr. Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the 9/11 Commission, "the weakest part of our homeland security is the citizen" (Kimery, 2008). The first responders have also suffered from complacency. According to a report released by the White House, and conducted by the National Association of Counties, the opinion expressed concern about the preparedness of first responders. The report stated that less than 10% of the counties surveyed were prepared to respond to any WMD incident. The report concluded by stressing that the national momentum to "improve first responder effectiveness is lapsing as a sense of complacency" (Bossert, 2004).

Suicide terrorism in the U.S. is expected to be an inevitable event, according to FBI Director Robert Mueller (Vernon, 2007). There have only been a few incidents in the U.S. where PBIED's were suspected, but yet have to be confirmed. As discussed earlier the "Discovery Channel" incident that occurred on September 1, 2010, and the "University of Oklahoma" (O.U.) incident that occurred October 1, 2005, are only two examples. In the "Discovery Channel" incident, the assailant entered the Discovery Channel headquarters building with a gun and took hostages. The assailant reported that he had explosives on his person. It was reported that police did find canisters strapped on his body; and that it was assumed to be IED's (Effron, L. and Goldman, R, 2010). The "O. U." incident, the victim/suspect had built a device with the home made explosive (HME), Tri-Acetone/Tri-Peroxide (TATP). In this incident the victim/suspect was sitting on a bench at the bus loop of the University's stadium while a football game was underway. The device functioned, killing him and not causing any other injuries (NY Times, 2005).

Both of those incidents involved an individual with explosives on the perpetrator's body. While the "Discovery Channel" incident was perpetrated by what could be considered a terrorist, 'an individual using violence to affect an outcome', the public information as to what the "canisters" were on his body can only be assumed to have been IEDs. Even if it were not, placing such items and alluding to their nature left law enforcement to handle this as a suicide bomber. The O.U. incident was determined to be a suicide, but we may never know the true intent of this individual (Explosion Kills, 2005). If nothing else, these incidents serve as a warning to public safety about the future potential of PBIED materializing on U.S. soil.

While researching suicide bombings and the response of such events, it has become clear that these incidents are a true hybrid and combination of hazards. These incidents are a combination of a MCI, Haz-Mat/Biological incident, crime scene and bomb incident. Although the author had not addressed the Haz-mat/Biological factor involved, it bears addressing at this point to emphasize the multi-hazardous situation that a PBIED creates. Doctors' Zeev Eshkol and Kalman Katz documented that bone

fragments from a suicide bomber had become fragmentation and penetrated into a number of victims in Israel, during the Intifadas and subsequent PBIED incidents. It was documented that one of the bombers was Hepatitis-B positive (Eshkol and Katz, 2005). They concluded that "any blood-borne disease with a carrier stage, such as Hepatitis B and C and HIV, can be passed to blast victims by penetration of biologic material from an infected suicide bomber or by metal fragments contaminated by his or her tissue or blood" (Eshkol and Katz, 2005). This example serves to show that each element of this type of event not only requires a multidisciplinary approach but a multi-agency unification for complete mitigation.

The British took note of the Israeli experience and the events of the 9/11 attacks. They used these experiences to conduct training and to create plans which they credit to being the key to the mitigation of the July 7, 2005, suicide bombing incidents (London Resilience, 2006). The British training was truly a multi-faceted, multi-public safety agency effort. This was evident, not only by the outcome of the July 7, 2005 incident, but due to the actions they took during the attempt of another terror wave within the same month. This incident led to a number of arrests and a coordinated effort to render a number of other devices safe; therefore handling the event at the onset with minimal disruption to the return of relative normalcy.

While conducting research for this ARP it was discovered that every organization, including OFD has MCI, WMD and Bomb SOP's. These SOPs make up the primary strategies and tactics to handle a PBIED. As alluded to by Chief Lawrence Schultz (personal communication, September 20, 2010) of DCFD, each SOP holds "a piece of the puzzle" to the mitigation of a PBIED event. This lends credence to the basis of the author's statement that a PBIED is a hybrid incident, since; by today's standard it requires elements of each of the above noted SOP's.

The Central Florida region is a prime target for acts of terrorism. Within this region there is a vast array of tourist oriented venues and the second largest convention center in the country. This makes it an attractive target due to the potential of inflicting a large loss of life and the media attention it would

generated. The two primary local governmental stakeholders with the largest potential to be targeted are Orange County and the City of Orlando, FL. Orange County's Fire-Rescue (OCFRD) and Sheriff Department's (OCSO) have a unified plan for responding to scenes of violence such as an active shooter. This involves assigned ballistic vest on board OCFRD EMS supervisor units and an understanding with the OCSO on how deployment would be conducted (Capt. R. Saez, personal communication, October 30, 2010). OFD and OPD have adopted a plan based on the events of an active shooter incident that occurred in November of 2009 and a subsequent training scenario that took place on April of 2010.

The events of September 11, 2001 caused great leaps in terrorism preparedness, however it was reactionary. The concept of crashing airliners into "urban areas" was born the 1970's (Merari, 2000). Since the inception of this tactic in the Middle-East, the Israeli's have been proactive in the prevention and planned accordingly. The Israelis' understood that not having a plan would lead to an "absence of an orderly process" and result in a negative impact to the "efficient and successful implementation of event management", thus affecting the ability to limit casualties (Perliger, Pedahzur & Zalmanovitch, 2005).

This is not just an issue for the City of Orlando, but is an emerging issue for the national. The Israeli's have planned and have placed mitigation efforts in place since the 1970's for the use of airliners as the ultimate VBIED. They perceived the threat and took pre-emptive steps. Nearly 40 years after this theoretical threat was conceived, it materialized here in the U.S. The May 1, 2010, Time Square, NY VBIED is the first documented case of this type of device being used in the U.S. This same device has been seen in other locations in the world. In fact, this device was used in Great Britain in 2006. Now in 2010, 4 years later, it has been found on American soil (FBI Law Enforcement Sensitive Communications, May 11, 2010).

A number of experts well versed in terrorism threats have been warning for over a decade that a PBIED will be seen on U.S. soil. Reports and articles such as "Thinking the Inevitable: Suicide Attacks in America and the Design of Effective Public Safety Policy" spell out this potential. The unfortunate

reality about not having a plan in place is best summed up by Mr. Sam Nunn of the University of Purdue, Indianapolis: “The alternative to all this is an intensive period of on-the-job training in which local police and emergency responders will face steep and unyielding curves—that is, a trial by death” (Nunn, 2004).

Recommendations

Based on the information from the background and significance literature review, the interviews conducted, and the case studies conducted in PBIED’s, the author has come to a number of conclusions. The main conclusion is that the City of Orlando’s Fire and Police Departments are not alone in the lack of pre-planning for a PBIED. It was also evident that public safety organizations in general do not possess specific plans and rely heavily upon MCI, Bomb and WMD SOP’s for mitigation. Though these would be sufficient for a post-blast single PBIED, it may very well fall short in a scenario where secondary PBIED was present.

The second major conclusion is the factor of complacency that is evident. For example, OFD creates an “Incident Commanders IED: Incident Guide” as a power-point in 2003 (Appendix F). This power-point, coupled with the fact that OFD has touch screen mobile computer terminals (MCT’s), is set up to be used as a check list for IED’s and has a constant reminder for secondary IED’s. This is an extremely useful tool but the program has not been updated in over 5 years and has been removed from many MCT’s. Also, due to the attrition in the department, the majority of the command officers are unaware of this tool.

The third most critical conclusion is the fact that public safety personnel and governmental leaders have relegated themselves to status quo; go with using the tools that we have in place. There is a vast amount of resources available that has been left untapped in the form of specialized training. One example is the “Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents” prepared by the New Mexico Institute and Technology, Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center. As the author indicated,

members of OPD have attended this class, though it was evident that these courses had an impact on their P&P's a gap still remains in the area of a PBIED.

After closer assessment of this ARP's purpose, goal, findings and conclusions, the author will be making and submitting a number of recommendations. These recommendations can be subdivided into three main categories. The first category is the compliance to CPG-101 with the inclusion of PBIED planning. The second category is the short and long term preparation of OFD and OPD personnel. Third is the creation of a unified policy between OFD and OPD.

The first recommendation deals with compliance in regards to CPG-101. As explained by the City of Orlando's Emergency Manager, Manuel Soto, there is no true compliance requirement by FEMA at this point. According to Mr. Soto and CPG-101 the current recommendation would be to have each department create a hazard or incident specific SOP. Once these SOP's are completed they need to be coupled with an "Incident Specific Annex" (ISA) as part of the City's Emergency Management Plans.

Therefore, the author's first recommendation is for the department's EM to create a committee of department subject matter experts to develop an "ISA" for a PBIED. These subject matter experts /committee members should also serve as members of an SOP committee for their respective departments, OFD and OPD. This will facilitate the creation of an SOP that will serve not only as a department plan, but as supporting documentation for the ISA.

Since a PBIED is a hybrid incident, the ISA will need to include elements of the state of Florida's EM Terrorism Annex. For example, one of the elements would be to include for proper notification of state and local entities to begin a rapid assessment and testing of the perpetrator for blood-borne pathogens. This would address the concerns that the perpetrator could be a carrier of pathogens such as Hepatitis-B, as documented in international medical journals.

The second recommendation is to set short and long term preparation goals. One of the short term goals for OFD is to reactivate the "Incident Commanders IED: Incident Guide" power-point. Once

reactivated, provide training to all command officers and those with the potential to work in a command capacity on the program. Implementation of this program will serve as a good starting point while upgrades are made to include PBIED's

Immediate training for IED recognition and scene management should to be considered for all OFD personnel. This training needs to include an introduction to donning and doffing a bomb technician in the protected ensemble. The training needs to include reinforcement that all personnel on the scene are responsible for the operational safety, to include a cursory sweep of their staging location and the command post. Long term goals include annual training and exercises to reinforce safety and operational considerations.

OPD has already established a priority for a short term goal. That goal is to include basic bomb recognition classes for all of their personnel. It was encouraging to the author to see the OPD High-Risk command personnel become so proactive based on a short meeting . My recommendation to OPD for the short term includes a consideration for an expansion of the bomb recognition to include operational issues. One of the key training points is the reinforcement of conducting a full threat assessment on suspicious packages prior to any manipulation occurring.

OPD's High-risk incident command staff voiced concerned about the mental preparation and decision making process for the neutralization of a suspect by their average patrol officer. Training the average officer to make such a critical decision needs to be a short term goal. Refresher training in bomb recognition and use of force considerations needs to be established as a long term goal for OPD.

The final recommendation is that both OFD and OPD have a unified plan for mitigation of a PBIED incident. The hybrid nature of a PBIED requires a mutual understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each organization. The first positive step toward the fulfillment of this recommendation has taken place. That is OPD's ESU has already established a relationship with OFD's Haz-Mat team.

Once the SOP's are created and a unified plan is agreed upon, the next logical step is to have a joint training exercise to work out the "kinks." The EAFSOEM student manual makes the point that it is "only through continued training that we can improve our ability to respond before, during and after" a major incident occurs (NFA, 2009, p. 1-6).

The author has created a draft of a recommended P & P and an IED Building/Lobby Control worksheet for OFD to consider. The P & P will be formatted as a "Special Order" for OFD. Both the P & P and the worksheet will be submitted to OFD's Administration for their consideration in the future development of a SOP for a PBIED (Appendix G & G-1 respectively).

References

Aguilar, D. (2005). Strengthening border security between ports of entry: The use of technology to protect our borders. *Hearing before the subcommittee: On immigration, border security and citizenship and the subcommittee: On terrorism, technology and homeland security of the senate committee: On the Judiciary*, 109th Cong. (written statement of David Aguilar, Chief, Border Patrol, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).

Blanchard, et. al, (2007), *Principles of emergency management supplement*, Retrieved on August 16, 2010 from www.iaem.com/publications/documents/PriciplesofEmergency Management.pdf

Bossert, P. A. (2004). The homeland security papers: Stemming the tide of terror. *Chapter 7-Improving the effectiveness of first responders in homeland security*. U.S. Air Force Counter Proliferation Center: publications, research & education pp. 143-162. Retrieved on October 7, 2010 from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/his_papers/bossert.pdf

City of Orlando, Economic Development Department. (2007). *Growth management plan 2006-2030 growth projections report.* Orlando, FL. Retrieved on March 15, 2008 from http://www.cityoforlando.net/planning/cityplanning/Growth%20Projections/2006thru2030GrowthProjectionsReport.pdf

Day, D. C. (2008). *A uniform approach to national suicide bomber incident response and recovery.* Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. Retrieved On September 1, 2010 from http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/mar/08/mar_day.pdf

Department of Homeland Security, (2008), *National response framework,* FEMA Publication P-682 (Catalog Number 08011-1).

Effron, L. and Goldman, R. (Reporters). (September 1, 2010). ABC News, *Environmental militant killed by police at discovery channel headquarters*. New York: American Broadcast Company. Retrieved on September 10, 2010 from http://abcnews.go.com/US/gunman-enteres-discovery-channel-headquaters-employees-evacuated/story?id=11535128&page=1

Eshkol, Z. and, Katz, K. (2005). Injuries from biologic material of suicide bombers. *Injury: International journal of the care of the injured.* 36(2), pp. 271-274, Elsevier. Amsterdam

Explosion kills one at Oklahoma campus. (October 2, 2005). *New York Times*. Retrieved on October 7, 2010 from www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02blast.html?_r=1

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1996). *State and local guide (SLG) 101: Guide for all-hazard emergency operations planning.* Washington, DC: FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2004). *Responding to incidents of national consequences: Recommendations for america's fire and emergency services based on the events of september 11, 2001, and other similar incidents.* Washington, DC: FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2008). *National response framework.* Washington, DC: FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2009). *Comprehensive planning guide 101: Developing and maintaining state, territorial, tribal, and local government emergency plans*. Washington, DC: FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency (2010). *FEMA history*. Retrieved June 4, 2010 from: http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2010a). In *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, Retrieved on June 4, 2010 from http://www.enwikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Emergency_Management_Agency

Fendel, H. (2010). Israel and u.s. to train together for emergency response. *Artz Sheva IsraelNatationalNews.com*. Retrieved on July 20, 2010 from www.israelnatationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/13572

Force Science Institute. (2008). Can this "uniform response framework" defeat suicide bombers? *Force Science News #108*: Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from http://www.forcescience.org/fsinews/2008/10/can-this-%e2%80%9cuniform-response-framework%e2%80%9d-defeat-suicide-bombers/

Hoffman, B. (2003). The logic of suicide terrorism. In *The Atlantic*. Washington, DC: The Atlantic Media Co., Retrieved on June 9, 2010 from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archieve/2003/06/the-logic-of-suicide-terrorism/2739/

Hoffman, B., Brannan, D., Herren, E., Matthiessen, R. (2004). Preparing for suicide terrorism: A primer for american law enforcement agencies and officers. *Congressional Report*. Rand Corporation. Santa Monica, CA. Retrieved on August 7, 2010, from http://www.rand.org/congress/newsletters/suicide_terrorism.html

Home Front Command (Israel). (2010). *Correct behavior in a terrorist event*. Retrieved on May 7, 2010 from www.oref.org.il/318-en/PAKAR.aspx

Home Front Command. (2010 a), *Training the public*. Retrieved on May 7, 2010 from http://www.oref.org.il/79-en/PAKAR.aspx

International Fire Fighter. (2010). Local scene: FDNY fire fighters help foil time square terror attack. *Journal of the International Association of Fire Fighters*, 93, 8-9.

Intifada. (2010). In *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.* Retrieved on June 4, 2010 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intifada

Israel Police Force, 2010. *Public information, introduction*. Retrieved on September 1, 2010 from http://www.police.gov.il/english/Pages/IsraelPolice.aspx

Kimery, A. L. (2008). Emergency preparedness complacency worries readiness authorities. In *HSToday*. Retrieved on October 2, 2010 from www.hstoday.us/contnt/view/3531/149/

Layden, J. (2010). Israel Defense Forces IDF Home Front Command exercise turning point 4. *Israeli News Agency*. Retrieved on September 3, 2010 from www.israelnewsagency.com/idfisraeldefenseturningpointexercisehomefrontcommandwarterrorism misslesyrianlebanoncivildefense48052410.html

List of Palestinian suicide attacks. (2010). In *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, Retrieved on August 1, 2010 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Palestinian_suicide_attacks?wwparam=1286076765

London Resilience Team. (2006). Looking back, moving forward: The multi-agency debrief: Lessons identified and progress since the events of 7 July 2005. *London Resilience Team*. London.

Magen David Adom. (2010). *About MDA.* Retrieved on September 2, 2010 from http://www.mdais.com/271/

Merari, A. (2000). Israel's preparedness for high consequence terrorism. *Belfer center for science and international affairs discussion paper*. Retrieved on September 9, 2010 from http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/mea02.pdf

McCaul, M. T. (Chairman). (2008). *A line in the sand: Confronting the threat at the southwest border,* Prepared by the majority staff of the house committee on homeland security subcommittee on investigations. October 12, 2008. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC.

Moaveni, A. (2002). Could suicide bombings happen here? *Time Magazine*. Retrieved on August 13, 2010 from www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,227494,00.html

National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB). (2010, January). *National strategic plan for U.S. bomb squads*. Denver, CO: Author

National Counterterrorism Center. (2009). *2008 Report on terrorism*. Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Counterterrorism Center. Washington, DC

National Fire Academy. (2009). *Executive analysis of fire service operations in emergency management (EAFSOEM), student manual, (2nd ed.).* Emmitsburg, MD: National Emergency Training Center.

Nunn, S. (2004). "Thinking the inevitable: Suicide attacks in america and the design of effective public safety policies." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management.* Vol. 1 (4) Article 401.

Nuriel, N. (2002). IDF home front command, structure and aim of the h.f.c. *Home Front Command Doctrine and Development Department.* [Power point presentation], Retrieved on October 1, 2010 from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-conf2002/nuriel.ppt

Orlando International Airport. (2010) In *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*, Retrieved on September 30, 2010 from http://www.enwikipedia.org/wiki/Orlando_International_Airport

Orlando/Orange County Convention & Visitor Bureau, Inc. (2010). *Attraction Attendance*. Retrieved on June 23, 2010 from www.orlandoinfo.com/reserch/market/attraction_attendance.cfm

Orlando Police Department. (2008). *Policy and Procedure 1308.3, Major Incidents*. Orlando, FL: OPD

Palmieri, J., Richmond, A., Perelman, M. (2010). Suicide bombing in the city of dimona: Tactics, techniques, and lessons learned by law enforcement. *Homeland Security News*. Penn Well Corporation. Retrieved on August 7, 2010 from www.takresponse.com/index/homeland-security/suicide-bombing_in.html

Perlinger, A., Perdahzur, A., and Zalmanovitch, Y. (2005). The defensive dimension of the battle against terrorism-An analysis of management of terror incidents in jerusalem. *Journal of contingencies and crisis management*. Blackwell Publishing. Malden, MA.

Romach, S. and Moncaz, A. (2005). Confronting acts of terror- Israel fire and rescue services experience. *International Workshop on Emergency Response and Rescue*. Retrieved on September 4, 2010 from http://ncdr.nat.gov.tw/iwerr/doc/pdf/S4%20PDF/s4-1-Shimon%20Romach.pdf

Rorke, H. (n.d.). *10 tips for designing effective job aids*. Retrieved on August 1, 2009 from Technical Report Writing Fundamentals (EN 3560): http://saulcarliner.home.att.net/en3560/howtosample.htm

Rozdilsky, J.L. (December 4, 2009), *Emergency management in Israel: Context and Characteristics*, Retrieved on June 23, 2010 from www.training.feam.gov/EMIWeb/edu/ComparativeEMBook-EMinIsrael-ContextandCharacteristics.pdf

U.S. Patriot Act. (2010) *Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*. Retrieved on June 4, 2010 from http://www.enwikipedia.org/wiki/Definition_of_terrorism#USA_Patriot_act

United States Fire Administration, National Fire Academy (revised October 1, 2010). *Executive fire officer program, Operational policies and procedures, applied research guidelines, frequently asked questions (FAQ).* Emmitsburg, MD: Author

Vernon, A. (2007). Responding to a suicide bombing incident. *Fire Engineering.* Retrieved on August 14, 2010 from http://www.fireengineering.com/fireengineering/en-us/index/articles/generic-article-tools-template.articles.fire-engineering.volume-160.issue-9.terrorism-and-thefire-service.responding-to-a-sucide-bombing-incident.html

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), 2003. *WMD-CST Fact Sheet*, 103rd Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team, AK. Retrieved on September 13, 2010 from http://c21.maxwell.af.mil/wmd-cst.htm

Wilber. T. K. (2005). Situation report: Bomb squads and the emerging threats. *Homeland1*. Retrieved on July 14, 2010 from http://www.homeland1.com/homeland-security-products/explosive-containement-vessels/articles/394711-situation-report-bomb-squads-and-the-emerging-threats/

WSBTV. (2010). *Channel2: Investigates u.s. boarder security part 1 and part2*. [Television broadcast] Atlanta, American Broadcast Company News affiliate. Retrieved on June 13, 2010 from http://www.wsbtv.com/video/23438021/index.html and http://www.wsbtv.com/video/23438712/index.html

Appendix A

Risk/Vulnerability Matrix



Appendix B

Risk/Vulnerability Matrix for OPD High-risk Incidents.



*OPD has created policies and check lists for these incidents.

‡ Both OFD and OPD have SOP's or P&P's for these incidents.

† OPD has dealt with these types of incidents.

Note: OPD have other "High-Risks" listed under their Policy and Procedure "High-Risk Incidents"

Appendix C

FBI and DHS Bomb Stand-off Card



BOMB THREAT STAND-OFF CARD

Threat Description	Explosives Capacity	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	Shelter-in-Place Zone	Preferred Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	71-1199 ft	+1200 ft
Suicide Bomber	20 lbs	110 ft	111-1699 ft	+1700 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 ft	151-1849 ft	+1850 ft
Car	500 lbs	320 ft	321-1899 ft	+1900 ft
SUV/Van	1,000 lbs	400 ft	401-2399 ft	+2400 ft
Small Delivery Truck	4,000 lbs	640 ft	641-3799 ft	+3800 ft
Container/Water Truck	10,000 lbs	860 ft	861-5099 ft	+5100 ft
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lbs	1570 ft	1571-9299 ft	+9300 ft

Homeland Security

Blast Card Overview for JPO
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5



Homeland Security

Blast Card Overview for JPO
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6

Note: Document marked for "OFFICIAL USE ONLY", retrieved from: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CC8QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fargo.k12.nd.us%2Feducation%2Fcomponents%2Fdocmgr%2Fdownload.php%3Fsectiondetailid%3D17214%26fileitem%3D20616&ei=Ij_jTJOoOoOClAfP7KXJDg&usg=AFQjCNHJuC4cF35X65KL89aSc6iYQoQK6w

Appendix D

General Operations Schematic for PBIED.



Appendix E

List of Metropolitan Departments the author made contact with.

Department	***Response***
Chicago Fire Department, Illinois	Negative response.
Dallas Fire Department, Texas	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
District of Colombia Fire Department	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
Fairfax County Fire and Rescue. Va	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
Fire Department of New York, NY	Negative response.
Fort Worth Fire Department, Texas	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
Minneapolis Fire Department , Mn.	Negative response.
Orange County Fire Rescue, Fl.	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
Palm Beach County Fire-Rescue, Fl.	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's
Raleigh Fire Department, NC	Negative response.
Shreveport Fire Department, Louisiana	Confirmed Haz-Mat, Bombing and MCI SOP's

This is only a small sample of departments where the author contacted to obtain information on their SOP's and to establish if there were any department with specific information relating to the topic.

Appendix F

Orlando Fire Department IC's IED Power-point.

Appendix G

Orlando Fire Department **SPECIAL ORDER**	**Issue Date:** **January 1, 2011**	**Effective:**	**CANCELLATION DATE:**	**Number:** **SO 2010-602-__**
Applicable to: **ALL OFD PERSONNEL**			**Approved by:** **, Fire Chief**	
Issued By:				
Subject: **Suicide Bomber (PBIED)**				**Amends:**
Reference				**Rescinds:**

1.0 PURPOSE

1.1 The purpose of this S.O. is to give personnel of a number of tactical and operational considerations that need to be addressed during a Suicide Bomber incident. These considerations are to compliment the current SOP's and policies in place.

2.0 DEFINITIONS

2.1 Improvise Explosive Device (IED): any object/container that has been modified from its intended use to contain explosive materials and designed to detonate.
2.2 Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED): synonymous with suicide bomber.
2.3 Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED): any vehicle that used as an IED. To include bicycles, motorcycles, aircraft, ect… May or may not be a suicide bomber.
2.4 Explosive Train: the process of initiated the main explosive charge of a device or explosive.
2.5 Home-made explosives (HME): an explosive made from commercially available materials/chemicals. Usually a very unstable and unpredictable chemical mixture.
2.6 Detonator/Initiator: Synonymous term. All explosives devices use some form or of device used to initiate the primary explosive charge, e.g. an initiator. This is the most unstable and dangerous part of the explosive train. Initiators contain the most sensitive/unstable explosives and are prone to detonation by physical shock and static electricity.
    2.6.1 Blasting Caps: the primary form of an initiator. Can be commercial or improvised with a HME

2.7 Render Safe Procedure (RSP): Actions taken by a bomb tech to render the device safe. Tactics may include counter charging or disruption of the explosive train.

3.0 GUIDELINES

3.1 PBIED's are an extreme hybrid incident. These incidents will contain elements of a MCI, WMD (Haz-Mat and C**B**RN**E** elements), crime scene, and potential for structural integrity issues and secondary fires.

3.1.1 Personnel need to be familiar with the following SOP's & P&P's.

3.1.1.1 G.O. 2004-610-56 Bomb Threats, Explosive Devices, and Bomb Scenes.

3.1.1.2 G.O. 2002-xx-xxxx "Weapons of Mass Destruction.

3.1.1.3 EMS Manual 2001-606-14: MCI Triage System

3.1.1.4 G.O. 2003-601-32 Crime Scene Preservation.

3.2 Determining if a non-VBIED explosion is a PBIED.

3.2.1 Responders need to have a high index of suspicion when responding to an explosion with reports of:

3.2.1.1 The incident occurring in a high profile location or event.

3.2.1.1.1 Locations know to have a high pedestrian presence.

3.2.1.2 Multiple calls will certainly be received by 911 centers. There may or may not be a caller who advises that it was a suicide bomber. Communications needs to be promoted to report any additional information while responding.

3.2.2 Assessment by first arriving unit: (If any of the below indicators are found, it needs to be reported immediately.)

3.2.2.1 A general assessment needs to be completed, including initial contact with walking wounded.

3.2.2.2 A prime indicator is the condition of any bodied at the seat of the explosion.

3.2.2.2.1 Once a suicide bombers detonates themselves, a responder may find:

3.2.2.2.1.1 A traumatically severed head. Usually an indicator of an Explosive Vest.

3.2.2.2.1.2 Severed torso with the potential of dismemberment and separation of the legs and/or thoracic region and head intact. May be an indicator was a "belt" type of device.

3.2.2.2.1.3 Large portions of a human torso that is missing. For example: women suicide bombers, this could be a potential of a "bra bomb". So the expectation would be a significant portion of the thoracic region may be missing or the torso will be split at the location of the explosive.

3.3 General Scene Safety

3.3.1 From the moment of response to arrival and operating all personnel needs to be thinking safety. These types of incidents are a hybrid/combination of hazards.

3.3.2 Personnel need to aware of the potential for a **secondary device or PBIED**. Every responder is responsible to conduct a general sweep (visual) of their surrounding for any potential suspicious person or device.

3.3.2.1 Any responder that finds an object or person that they deem a potential IED or hazard is OBLIGATED to sound the alarm for evacuation.

3.3.2.2 Once the object in question has been cleared by a Bomb Tech, crews will be allowed back to continue triage and treatment of victims.

3.3.3 The initial approach to this type of incident needs to be with full PPE including PBA's.

3.3.3.1 The down grading of PPE will be based on a full assessment of the incident and all of the potential hazards that will be encountered. This will be at the discretion of the Incident Commander.

3.4 General Tactical Considerations

3.4.1 When approaching the scene, personnel need to consider their surroundings and the ease of access and egress for transport units.

3.4.1.1 Crews should also take into consideration if they have responded to this same location on false alarms in the past few months. If so they need to consider approaching and staging at a different location.

3.4.2 Hot, warm and cold zones need to be established, much like a Haz-Mat scene.

3.4.3 The most critical areas that need an immediate sweep for secondary devices and bombers are the Hot Zone, ingress/egress points and the established treatment/transport division.

3.4.3.1 Crews should recruit OPD officers to assist in the sweep.

3.5 Command considerations:

3.5.1 If the responding D/C has confirmed the detonation of a device with multiple patients involved, he/she needs to confirm the mechanism of injury.

3.5.1.1 The D/C then needs to establish face-to-face communications with the ranking OPD Officer. If contact with the ranking OPD officer has not been established immediately, the IC needs to have the Com. Center notify OPD as to the location of the C.P.

3.5.2 If it has been confirmed that this was a suicide bomber the IC needs to consider the following:

3.5.2.1 The Bomb Squad is responding.

3.5.2.2 The appropriate SOP are been implemented: i.e. MCI, Bombing , etc…

3.5.2.3 The Haz-Mat is responding.

3.5.2.4 The Emergency Manager is responding to the Com. Center.

3.5.2.5 Establishing a liaison with OPD.

3.5.3 **<u>Detonation inside of a building.</u>** *(May of the concepts are applicable to out-door scenes, but an incident inside of a structure brings in additional hazards that are consistent with structural fire fighting considerations.)*

3.5.3.1 These incidents will have an automatic response equivalent to a structure fire (3-Eng, 2-Tower, 1-Rescue, Heavy Rescue and 2-D/Cs').

3.5.3.1.1 Early consideration in additional alarms and transport units.

3.5.3.1.2 Technical Rescue and Resources need immediate attention:

3.5.3.1.2.1 Extrication personnel

3.5.3.1.2.2 Haz-Mat

3.5.3.1.2.3 Bomb

3.5.3.2 Command should consider the establishment of a Building Systems Officer Immediately, possible with the first arriving Truck Company. Possibly establishing a Lobby Control Officer as well. This crew should consider using the "IED Building/Lobby Control" worksheet to assist in completing critical tasks.

3.5.3.2.1 The control of the following needs to be a priority:

3.5.3.2.1.1 Electric Utilities: Attempt to only control/isolate the rooms involved. This will allow for the ease of portable lighting to be deployed.

3.5.3.2.1.2 Fire Protection Sprinklers: This will improve visibility and assist in decreasing the spread of bio-hazardous materials (Blood).

3.5.3.3 <u>Securing the scene</u>: Command needs to consider using the Heavy rescue to conduct the following (but not limited to):

3.5.3.3.1 Assess structure stability and safety for operations.

3.5.3.3.2 Extrication and rescue of victims entrapped.

3.5.3.3.3 Clear obstacles, such as cables, wires, hanging ceiling. Also, assist in creating access and egress point, including secondary egress.

3.5.3.3.4 Clear all glass hazards from any shattered windows.

3.5.3.3.5 Assist Building Systems Officer as needed to control water and electrical hazards.

3.6 Discovery of a Secondary Device or PBIED.

3.6.1 Upon discovery of a secondary device, emergency traffic is to be initiated and an immediate evacuation of all personnel needs to commence.

3.6.1.1 The person who discovers the device is to report to the command post and meet with Bomb Squad personnel to provide information on the device.

3.6.1.1.1 Information should include: Location and description of the suspected device.

3.6.2 If personnel discover a secondary PBIED that is among the wounded, he/she shall immediately sound the alarm and evacuate to hard cover or create distance.

3.6.2.1 Any OPD officer present in-side of the hot zone is there only for protection and security of responders. This officer needs to be immediately notified so that they can take the steps necessary to neutralize the threat.

3.6.2.2 Personnel will completely evacuate and stand-by until cleared by a Bomb Tech.

3.7 Detonation at an outside venue.

3.7.1 Refer to the Bomb SOP for general information.

3.7.2 To emphasize, BE AWARE OF SECONDARY DIVICES/PBIED's.

3.7.3 OFD will coordinate with OPD to assist in completing a general bomb sweep and the incident unfold.

4.0 POSTING & RETENTION – Post and retain in accordance with G.O.2000-601-01.

Appendix G-1

Interior IED: Building / Lobby Control Sheet (front pg.)



Appendix G-1

Interior IED: Building / Lobby Control Sheet (back page)

CRITICAL FUNCTIONS / ACTIONS

OPEN as many Doors & Windows (Estab. as much Ventilation as Possible)

Identify Emergency Evacuation Routes (secondary Egress)

Identify Cleared Rooms / Safe Rooms — Location of Rooms

Triage Treatment	
Evacuation/Stage on or Non-Injure	

Remove all non-essential objects to increase floor room: ie: tables chairs, etc...

Establish best set up for auxillary lighting and ventilation.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____